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Abstract— In this paper we describe the design of a new set of 
empirical studies we will run to test the gains in detection 
capabilities from using diverse AntiVirus products. This new 
work builds on previous work on this topic reported in [1, 2, 3]. 
We describe the motivation for this work, how it extends the 
previous work and what studies we will conduct.   
Keywords - security assessment; anti-virus products; 
honeypots and honeynets; fault tolerance; instrusion tolerance; 
software diversity. 
I. BACKGROUND 
All systems, including those built from off-the-shelf 
components, need to be sufficiently reliable and secure in 
delivering the service that is required of them. Various ways 
in which this reliability and security can be achieved in 
practice ranges from the use of various validation and 
verification techniques to the use of software fault/intrusion 
tolerance techniques. Fault tolerance techniques range from 
simple “wrappers” of the software components [4] to the use 
of diverse software products in a fault-tolerant system [5]. 
This latter strategy of implementing fault tolerance was 
historically considered prohibitively expensive, due to the 
need for developing multiple bespoke software versions. 
However, the wide proliferation of off-the-shelf software for 
various applications has made the use of software diversity 
an affordable option for fault tolerance against either 
malicious or non-malicious faults.  
A recent publication [1] has detailed an implementation 
of an AntiVirus (AV) platform that makes use of diverse AV 
products for malware detection. A similar architecture that 
uses diverse AV email scanners has been commercially 
available for several years [6]. Hence architectural solutions 
for employing diverse detection engines with AV products 
are already known and in some cases commercially 
deployed. Studies that provide empirical evaluation of the 
effectiveness of diversity for detection of malware are, on the 
other hand, much more scarce.  
The following claim is made on the VirusTotal site [7]: 
“Currently, there is no solution that offers 100% 
effectiveness in detecting viruses, malware and malicious 
URLs”. Given these limitations of individual AV engines, 
designers of security protection systems are interested in at 
least getting estimates of the possible gains in terms of added 
security that the use of diversity (e.g. diverse AV products) 
may bring for their systems. 
Two authors of this paper have reported previously [2], 
[3] (together with other colleagues from CSR, City 
University London, Symantec Research and Institute 
Eurecom) results which analysed the detection capabilities of 
different AV products
1
and potential improvements in 
detection that can be observed from using diverse AV 
products. We observed that some AV products achieved high 
detection rates, but none detected all the malware samples in 
our study. We also found many cases of regression in the 
detection capability of the AV products: cases where an AV 
would regress from detecting the malware on a given date to 
not detecting the same malware at a later date(s). We saw 
significant improvements in the detection capability when 
using two or more diverse AV products. For example, even 
though no single AV product detected all the malware in our 
study, almost 25% of all the diverse 1-out-of-2 pairs
2
 of AV 
products, and over 50% of all diverse 1-out-of-3 triplets of 
AV products successfully detected all the malware. We also 
observed significant potential gains in reducing the “at risk 
time” of a system from employing diverse AVs: even in the 
cases where AVs fail to detect a malware, there is diversity 
in the time it takes different vendors to successfully define a 
signature for the malware and detect it.  
The results were intriguing. They concern, however, a 
specific snapshot in the detection capabilities of AV products 
against malware threats prevalent in that time period: the 
analysis was based on 1599 malware samples collected from 
a distributed honeypot deployment over a period of 178 days 
from February to August 2008. 
Additionally, our dataset contains only confirmed 
malware. Hence we could measure failure of AV products to 
detect genuine malware (false negatives), but we could not 
measure cases where benign files are incorrectly identified as 
malware (false positives). False positive rate is an important 
measure when evaluating the effectiveness of any detection 
system, including AV products. 
II. ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL STUDIES TO TEST GAINS 
FROM DIVERSITY WITH DIVERSE ANTI-VIRUS PRODUCTS 
With these limitations in mind, we are designing new 
studies collecting new data and performing further analysis 
                                                          
1
 For the sake of brevity, in the rest of the paper we will use the short-hand 
notation AV, or AV product to refer to the signature-based component of 
an AntiVirus detection engine. 
2 A failure of a 1-out-of-2 pair occurs when both of the constituent AVs 
fail. 
of the potential benefits of diversity with AV products. The 
new work will also allow us to compare the new findings 
with the previous study and hence provide another viewpoint 
on the benefit, or otherwise, of using diverse AV products 
for malware detection.   
We will use the network of honeypots deployed at the 
University of Maryland. Honeypots are virtual or physical 
hosts used for the sole purpose of collecting malicious 
activity. Thus, they have no production value and the 
network traffic they received is either due to 
misconfiguration or attacks. For two of the authors of this 
paper, the experience working with honeypots has been a 
multi-year learning process during which we incrementally 
improved the way we conducted honeypot-based empirical 
studies. The collected data were used in various research 
conducted (i.e., [8, 9]). The farm of hundreds of honeypots 
consists of low interaction honeypots (deployed at several 
organizations in the USA, Europe and Africa) and high 
interaction honeypots which goal is to characterize attacks 
and attackers. The data we will use will be collected on the 
low interaction honeypots that run dionaea [10]. dionaea was 
specifically developed to catch the complete attack payload, 
i.e., the malware. The malware collected will be sent daily to 
the VirusTotal [7] web service which allows the analysis by 
the signature-based engines of up to 37 different AV 
vendors. To test the evolution of the detection capability of 
the AV products we again plan to collect and send the 
malware over an extended period of time. In [2, 3] we did 
this for a period of up to 30 days. In the new experiments, in 
order to get more extensive and accurate measures of the “at 
risk time” (namely, the periods when no (“correct”) signature 
exists for the detection of a given malware by a given AV 
product) we will continuously run the study over a period of 
several months (i.e., at least three months). 
We will also collect data to assess the rate of false 
positives of AV products. However, we must stress that the 
exact experimental method we will use to obtain the data 
which would allow for this assessment is currently work in 
progress. We can, of course, just artificially create a large set 
of non-malicious files which we could then send to the AV 
products and obtain respective false positive rates. The 
representativeness of this kind of experiment is, however, 
difficult to justify: the non-malicious files chosen in this way 
are unlikely to be representative samples of the ones that AV 
products may be expected to inspect in normal operation. 
Choosing representative test loads and defining what 
constitutes a false positive is a matter of some debate in the 
AV community (see discussion in [11]). However, obtaining 
data on false positives remains high on our priority list to 
enable a more comprehensive assessment of the AV products 
detection capabilities and the possible benefits of diversity. 
We will study the confidentiality and data privacy issues 
with obtaining data on files that AV viruses inspect during 
normal operation in a small business or university campus. 
This will at least give us representative sets of both malicious 
and non-malicious files that an AV product would be 
expected to inspect in these environments. This data would 
complement the dataset on malicious files that we would 
collect from the honeypots, as explained above. 
We also plan to research the architectural aspects of 
using diverse AntiVirus products and the performance  
overheads that this may bring, building on work that has 
been reported by other researchers [1] and commercial 
vendors [6]. 
Finally, we plan to do more extensive exploratory 
modeling, as well as modeling for prediction. In previous 
work [3], we observed that an empirically derived hyper-
exponential model proved to be a remarkably good fit to the 
proportion of systems in each diverse setup that had a zero 
failure rate. The new dataset will allow us to test if the 
hyper-exponential distribution is more likely to be generic. If 
it is, it would be a useful means for predicting the expected 
detection rates for a system with a high degree of diversity 
(i.e., a high number of diverse AV products) based on 
measurements made with simpler diverse configurations 
(say, with 2 or 3 diverse AV products). We also plan to study 
to what extent these models can be extended to incorporate 
the time dimension (the “at risk time” from lack of signature 
definitions for a given product). This would allow a decision 
maker to more optimal trade-offs between detection rates 
and the “at risk time” when selecting diverse AV products 
for their configuration.  
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